Philippines announces plan to back out of US military defense alliance after 2 decades

Trump, Philippines' Duterte meet amid drug war controversy

Philippine spokesman denies White House claim that human rights was briefly discussed; chief White House correspondent John Roberts reports from Manila.

The Philippines notified the United States on Tuesday it would end a major security pact allowing American forces to train in the country – a pivotal move under President Rodrigo Duterte, who threatened to pull out of the agreement after his key ally's U.S. visa was terminated.

Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin announced on Twitter that he notified the U.S. Embassy in Manila that the Philippines is pulling out of the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The accord allows American forces, along with U.S. military ships and aircraft, to rotate through Philippine military bases for roughly 300 joint exercises annually with Filipino troops.“The Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of the United States has received the notice of termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement,” Locsin tweeted. “As a diplomatic courtesy, there will be no further factual announcements following this self-explanatory development.”

Teddy Locsin Jr.

✔@teddyboylocsin

@DFAPHL The Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of the United States has received the notice of termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement. As a diplomatic courtesy there will be no further factual announcements following this self-explanatory development. https://twitter.com/dododulay/status/1227085202683396102 …

Dodo Dulay@dododulay

On the order of the President thru Executive Secretary Medialdea, Foreign Affairs Secretary Locsin signed today the notice of termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which will delivered to the US Embassy in Manila forthwith. @DFAPHL

The agreement will be terminated in 180 days unless both sides can negotiate a way to keep it. The U.S. Embassy in Manila acknowledged receipt of Manila’s notice and said Washington “will carefully consider how best to move forward to advance our shared interests.”

Feb. 10, 2020: Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte delivers a speech during the 11th Biennial National Convention and 22nd founding anniversary of the Chinese Filipino Business Club, Inc. in Manila, Philippines. (Toto Lozano/Malacanang Presidential Photographers Division via AP)

“This is a serious step with significant implications for the U.S.-Philippines alliance,” the embassy said in a statement. “Our two countries enjoy a warm relationship, deeply rooted in history. We remain committed to the friendship between our two peoples.”

Defense Secretary Mark Esper called the move “unfortunate,” adding, “I do think it would be a move in the wrong direction.” Both sides would have six months to come to a resolution before the agreement’s official end.

The U.S. is a longtime treaty ally, a major trading partner and the largest development aid provider to the Philippines.

Despite a 69-year alliance between the two nations, solidified by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, President Duterte has lashed out against Washington in the past, specifically after the U.S. visa of ally Sen. Ronald dela Rosa was reportedly canceled over alleged human rights violations committed as national police chief.

After Duterte took office in 2016, dela Rosa enforced the president’s deadly anti-drug crackdown, carrying out a bloody campaign that reportedly killed thousands of mostly poor Filipinos, The Associated Press reported. Duterte threatened to terminate the security agreement after the visa cancellation and gave Washington a month to restore it. U.S. officials have not publicly reacted to the Philippine leader's demand.

FLASHBACK: DUTERTE BANS US SENATORS FROM PHILIPPINES, THREATENS NEW VISA RULES FOR AMERICANS

In a speech Monday, Duterte said President Trump moved to save the agreement but added he rejected the idea. He accused the U.S. of meddling in Philippine affairs, including seeking the release of opposition Sen. Leila de Lima, whom he has accused of involvement in illegal drugs. She has dismissed the allegation as a fabricated charge meant to muzzle dissent.

“America is very rude. They are so rude,” Duterte said.

Aside from threatening to end the VFA, Duterte has said he will ban some critical U.S. senators from entering the Philippines.

Duterte has also barred Cabinet officials from traveling to the U.S. and turned down an invitation by Trump to join a special meeting the U.S. leader will host for leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in March in Las Vegas.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper told reporters Monday that VFA is crucial in implementing a separate Obama-era defense pact. The 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) allows the extended stay of U.S. forces, authorizing them to build and maintain barracks and warehouses and store defense equipment and weapons inside five designated Philippine military camps.

“All the engagements, all the freedom of navigation operations, all the exercises, all the joint training, having US military personnel in port, on the ground, on the flight line, does require that we have a mechanism that allows that, and that’s why the VFA is so important,” Cooper said in a teleconference with reporters on Monday.

Speaking before the Philippines Senate last week, Locsin proposed amending VFA, instead of scrapping it, arguing its termination would affect the joint exercises and other activities with U.S. forces “which the Philippine military and law enforcement agencies need to enhance their capabilities in countering threats to national security.”

The U.S. provided more than $550 million in security assistance to the Philippines from 2016 to 2019, Locsin said, adding that there may be a “chilling effect on our economic relations” if the Philippines draws down its security alliance with Washington.

American forces have provided intelligence, training and aid that allowed the Philippines to deal with human trafficking, cyberattacks, illegal narcotics and terrorism, Locsin said, citing how U.S. military assistance helped Filipino forces quell a disastrous siege by Islamic State group-aligned militants in southern Marawi city in 2017.

Duterte first threatened to abrogate the VFA in late 2016 after a U.S. aid agency put on hold funds for anti-poverty projects in the Philippines. He has walked back on such threats but his government’s action on Tuesday is the most serious indication of his intent to set back military ties with the U.S.

If U.S. Forces Have To Leave The Philippines, Then What?

The Philippines began the process of terminating its Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States in mid-February. In place since 1998, the VFA grants legal status to U.S. forces who are in the Philippines temporarily for exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and other contingencies. This legal status, similar to the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with Japan and South Korea, enables a predictable, dependable, and cooperative relationship between the Philippines and the United States, and also allows for the rapid execution of our responsibilities under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Without the legal protection granted by the VFA, U.S. forces sent to exercise with their Filipino counterparts or respond after a humanitarian emergency would face complicated and time-consuming processes to secure visas for personnel and access to bases and ports for equipment. Indeed, it was the VFA that enabled U.S. forces to respond faster than other nations after Super typhoon Yolanda in 2013.

The United States and the Philippines have 180 days to negotiate a new VFA. If, on day 181, there is no new VFA in place, its absence would neither automatically invalidate the MDT nor force the United States to pull out all service personnel and equipment in-country on rotation. However, it would place those personnel in legal limbo (and under Filipino jurisdiction in the event of a criminal incident) and make it that much harder for the United States to respond quickly in a crisis, both of which directly threaten the viability of the MDT. In this way, the VFA is a crucial piece of the U.S. ability to deter adversaries and reassure friends. The United States has a lot at stake in maintaining access to the Philippines.

At times when this access is in doubt, it is worth reviewing the impact of its loss. If, hypothetically, the loss of the VFA begins a chain reaction that, encouraged by Chinese pressure, ends with the dissolution of the MDT, the expulsion of U.S. forces, and denial of future access, what would that mean for U.S. operations? In essence, the loss of Filipino bases pushes the operational and logistical burden to four other main operating locations—South Korea, Japan (the mainland and Okinawa), Australia, and Guam. As a result, the size, speed, and character of forces deployed for conflicts related to the South China Sea and Taiwan would change, for two main reasons—one political, and one logistical.

Mutual Defense Treaties Do Not Guarantee Unfettered Access

A Mutual Defense Treaty is not a guarantor of operational access for any conflict that arises. Depending on the specifics of the conflict, the United States could face pressure from Seoul, Tokyo, or Canberra to not use their territory to launch military operations for a fight that they would not themselves get involved in.

This may cause particular complications for conflicts related to Taiwan. No major Indo-Pacific country recognizes Taiwan; some, like Australia, adhere to their own “one China” policy, which generally means that they “do not recognize Taiwan as a country,” but “maintain unofficial contacts with Taiwan promoting economic, trade and cultural interests.” All countries have strong economic ties to China, and therefore have a lot to lose. It is by no means guaranteed that Australia, Japan, or South Korea would allow U.S. bases on their territory prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Operating rights could be more fluid, and therefore unpredictable, regarding the South China Sea. For South Korea, the occupant of the Blue House at the time of the conflict would matter. Previous liberal administrations, like that of progressive Roh Moo-hyun, have been comparatively cool on the U.S.-South Korea alliance, opting to keep it so long as the United States does not demand political or military support. By contrast, Moon Jae-in has been more willing to lean into the alliance in order to enable greater capacity for South China Sea operations. Regardless of the party in power, a constant consideration would be South Korea’s relationship with, and willingness to antagonize, China. South Koreans still remember China’s anger over the decision to allow the United States to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system. 

For Japan, the reasons behind the conflict—and how the United States would plan to use its basing access—would be driving factors. Japan puts great stake in the language of “prior consultation” embedded in the “Exchange of Notes” between then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and then-Secretary of State Christian Herter who negotiated the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1960. According to the language, “Major changes in the deployment into Japan of U.S. Armed Forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under article V of said treaty, shall be subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.” If the conflict were to be seen as a referendum on China’s claims on disputed territory, then Japan might allow U.S. forces to operate as a means to secure its own claims on the Senkakus. However, a less hawkish prime minister might deny, or at least downgrade, U.S. operational capabilities.

Both Japan and South Korea have a coordination mechanism baked into their treaties with the United States that says, in essence, the governments must agree to the “specific facilities and areas” to be used by the U.S. military during a conflict. Depending on the situation, both countries have the ability to restrict U.S. operational access to a subset of locations.

For Australia’s part, although it does care about the South China Sea, it also is well aware that its alliance with the United States presents an “abandonment vs. entrapment” dilemma: eschew supporting an ally in a fight and risk losing them, or support an ally and risk being stuck fighting an unwanted war. For this and other reasons, Australia has sought peaceful resolutions when tensions have erupted in the South China Sea. 

Therefore, losing access to the Philippines increases U.S. vulnerability to the domestic politics and foreign policies of its other treaty allies. Even if those allies do grant the United States some kind of operational access, there may still be serious operational impacts if a conflict erupts.

Stretched Supply Lines to the South China Sea

Without the Philippines, U.S. forces would be faced with a series of math and physics problems from fighting from much further away.

The closest military facilities to the South China Sea are in Okinawa (approximately 1,000 miles), South Korea (1,600 miles), mainland Japan (2,000 miles), Guam (2,000 miles), and Darwin, Australia (2,300 miles). Such distances present a number of logistical and operational complications.

Because their path would largely take them over open ocean, forces flowing from Japan or South Korea would not travel through foreign airspace, allowing for a much straighter and faster course. However, they would be coming from—and moving through—areas well within the range of a sizeable Chinese missile quiver. To reduce that vulnerability, operational planners might be forced to move the bulk of these units to Guam and Australia.

Such great distances produce a heavier logistical burden, especially for the Air Force. Fighter jets would need to be refueled en route more often, giving hostile forces two prime targets rather than one. The Philippines and Indonesia also might deny U.S. forces access to their airspace, making the route even more circuitous.

More time spent aloft also means planners would run into crew rest restrictions. Assuming a flying speed of Mach 1.6, an F-35 pilot flying a sortie from Darwin to the South China Sea would spend a minimum of four hours in transit round trip, plus the duration of the sortie. Afterward, that pilot would be out of the fight for at least 10 hours on mandatory rest. Depending on the number of pilots available to fly and the operational tempo, ten hours can be a long time.

Beyond using Philippine bases as a forward operating location, these bases allow U.S. forces to preposition resupply materials close to the fight. Okinawa houses critical resupply materials, such as fuel and munitions for the Army and Air Force, but 1,000 miles is a long way when you’re in need.

Logistical Bottlenecks Surround Taiwan

If Taiwan is the area of operations, some U.S. military facilities are much closer—but come with serious complications. Okinawa and mainland Japan are just 450 miles away; South Korea and Guam are 1,300 miles and 1,700 miles away, respectively. (Darwin, at 2,300 miles away is a less-viable operational hub.) Assuming the bulk of forces come from and through Japan and South Korea by virtue of proximity, a logistical bottleneck for all reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) could arise.

The finite number of airfields, ports, and roads, and the rules and regulations surrounding their use, presents a logistical challenge. For example, to move large, heavy vehicles on mainland Japan’s roads, the U.S. military needs to request permission 45 days in advance and include proposed routes, the size and weight of each vehicle, and the specific map to be used. Permission is then granted not by the Ministry of Defense, but by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. In Okinawa, the Okinawan General Bureau adjudicates such requests at least 10 days in advance. Similar restrictions exist in South Korea.

While these restrictions could change during wartime, they would slow down U.S. force preparations before combat operations begin.

Time and Distance are an Enemy

If the United States were to lose access to bases in the Philippines, the effects will ripple outward. With fewer options available, even simply for staging and prepositioning, heavier loads will wind up elsewhere. And yet that may be unacceptable for diplomatic or logistical reasons.

In the worst-case scenario, in which U.S. forces have to flow from the United States to a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, time and distance would be as great an enemy as the adversary itself. Assuming a speed of 22 knots, a ship like the LHA 6, home-ported in San Diego, would take nine days to get to Tokyo, 12 days to get to Taiwan, and 13 days to get to the South China Sea. This is a slow response time to what might be a very rapid conflict. Indeed, it is dangerous to assume that the United States will have an unambiguous and timely warning of any conflict in the region.

In sum, then: Does the loss of the VFA fundamentally degrade U.S. operations in the region? No. But, could it be the first step towards that end result? Yes. This is why ensuring a U.S. soldier can train her counterpart in Manila without a visa also ensures she can also come to the defense of a U.S. treaty ally. Maintaining these alliances in the Indo-Pacific in all their manifestations is critical—and the details matter.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

The story of Palau and its place in US military strategy An archipelago of just 21,000 inhabitants, Palau has come to have a special place in the strategic plans of the world’s largest economy. We find out why the US places such importance on continued cooperation. “Palau is indispensable to our national security,” claimed the US Department of Defense in its 2018 budget request, describing the need for America to meet its funding commitments to this small Pacific state as ‘key to our strategic presence in the region’. That would be a huge accolade for any nation, but for one with a total landmass amounting to just 180 square miles, spread over a chain of some 340 islands, roughly 500 miles south east of the Philippines; it is nothing short of remarkable. The United States’ involvement with these islands dates back to the ‘Operation Forager’ campaign of June to November 1944, which ultimately saw US forces take Palau from the Japanese after a bloody and protracted two-and-a-half months of fighting at the Battle of Peleliu. After the Second World War, Palau, which had been placed under Japanese control by the League of Nations at the end of WWI, was then put under US administration by the United Nations as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). The original 1947 trusteeship agreement designated the TTPI a “strategic area” and until 1951, it was controlled by the US Navy from Guam, after which time the US Department of the Interior took over from a base in Saipan. Compact renewal Subsequently, moves towards Palauan independence began in 1978, with Palau finally becoming a sovereign state in 1994. Before that happened, however, the country joined with its TTPI fellows, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), signing a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the USA in 1982. Under the terms of the COFA, the US provides a package of financial assistance which is administered via the Office of Insular Affairs, and assumes responsibility for national defence and security, in return for the exclusive freedom to operate and base American armed forces across the COFA territory. The arrangement was intended to hold sway for 50 years, with a series of phased reviews and renewals along the way. However, while the compacts with the FSM and RMI were renewed for 20 years in 2003, and despite the successful conclusion of the Compact Renewal Agreement (CRA) talks for Palau in late 2010, there has been much foot-dragging around implementing it.As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred .” As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred from the Pentagon to the Interior Department, apparently citing reasons of ‘Congressional oversight’. For an island chain that few could find readily on a map, and for a sum of $123.9m over seven years – scarcely a drop in the ocean of US military spending – the argument in favour of renewal has drawn some pretty heavy-weight supporters, including the Head of the US Pacific Command, Senator John McCain and even the President himself. The reasons are clear; as the Whitehouse warned in its Statement of Administration Policy on the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), failing to approve the CRA risks the US losing “access and influence in a region that is increasingly contested by China.” Strategic posture Nearly 75 years on from the Pacific campaigns of WWII, Palau remains as strategically important as ever, commanding the approaches to Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, and flanking a number of other islands and archipelagos. Having exclusive military access to such a critically located swathe of real estate provides the US with what Admiral Harry Harris, Head of Pacific Command, has described as ‘a measurable advantage in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific’. Perhaps more to the point, it is one which Beijing would, unquestionably, be only too ready to gain for itself, should the opportunity arise. Given China’s ongoing policy of expanding its sphere of influence in an attempt to become the preeminent power in the region, a move towards Palau would be a very real possibility if the COFA renewal fails to materialise. For more than a decade, Beijing has been quietly encouraging the small Pacific nations, and most notably Fiji, to adopt a ‘look north’ approach and increasingly engage with Asia through China, backed up with the lure of enhanced Chinese economic and military co-operation. If the US really were to leave Palau with a funding vacuum, then it is hard to imagine that a suitably attractive offer denominated in yuan would not be forthcoming if it meant that Beijing could finally prise the island chain away from American control. Future of the CRA Exactly how large a hole that might leave in US military preparedness in the Asia-Pacific is hard to gauge, as very little detail is forthcoming about the precise nature of the role that Palau plays in it, beyond its very obvious strategic geography. There are very few clues to be gleaned from the terms of the COFA itself, beyond the prohibition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the islands and the eligibility of Palauan citizens to serve in the US armed forces. Apart from the occasionally publicised war games, such as the Embassy evacuation exercise in August 2015, the rest of whatever it is that the US does here appears to be too sensitive to make public. It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA. “It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA.” That future is likely to be decided in the months ahead, as the 2018 NDAA moves through the House-Senate conference committee stage and Congress members look to resolve the differences of position between the two chambers. Senator John McCain’s Senate Armed Service Committee has already included approval of the CRA in its version of the Act, paving the way for the Conference committee to merge the upper and lower chambers’ proposals, and finally allow the Palau Compact to be renewed and funded. The Senate Armed Service Committee’s argument is widely expected to prevail during the forthcoming conference discussions. While there is some understanding of the House of Representatives’ reticence over transferring budget funds from one department to another, few Washington commentators believe that this will trump the potential loss of prime operational geography, or the diminution of prestige and influence it would inevitably entail. As military spending goes, $17.7m a year will not buy very much – perhaps a new MQ-9 Reaper drone and some change to run it, or a 10% share in an F-35. Conversely of course, it could be used to buy another year’s exclusive access to some of the most strategically important islands in the Pacific. It is very hard to see the US walking away from that sort of bargain. The U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. A 69th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron B-52 Stratofortress prepares to taxi down the flightline on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Oct. 22, 2019. the Pacific, but provided few details regarding exact locations or operating concepts. Given the security situation in the Pacific, the U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. Furthermore, operating concepts for the hub and spoke base networks should aim to enhance resiliency, frustrate Chinese targeting, and further the United States’ geostrategic position.Esper’s call for additional basing is necessary based on U.S. interests, lack of current basing options, and China’s assertiveness. The recent Chinese Defense White Paper highlights China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, which is matched by actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and around Taiwan. These actions threaten American interests in the region, including freedom of navigation and the military geography of the U.S. position in the Pacific. Ultimately, U.S and allied military power in the region is the guarantor of the fair trade upon which the United States depends. Unfortunately, the United States has limited air bases in the region from which to project power. On the Asian mainland, the United States has only two air bases in South Korea, both of which are focused on preparing for and deterring war with North Korea. Beyond the mainland, the United States maintains air bases in Japan, but only Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is positioned to secure U.S. interests in the East China Sea (ECS) or SCS. The United States also maintains a base on Guam; however, the concentration of forces there make it a prime target for enemy operations. To help safeguard U.S. interests and to check China, the United States needs to establish a more robust base network in the region.The United States should develop an integrated base network using a hub and spoke model. A hub and spoke base network includes a main operating base (MOB) and collocated operating bases (COBs). This is not a new idea; the U.S. Air Force used a similar model to ensure survivability during the Cold War. The Cold War model was designed for continental use but could be adapted to the Pacific. In the original model, the MOB, or hub, was where the Air Force had forces permanently stationed. The spokes — COBs — were bare bones facilities. During peacetime the majority of forces would be based at the hubs; however, indications of war would trigger dispersal to the spokes. A 1986 RAND report identifies the required and desired facilities for COBs, summarized in Table 1.Additionally, the MOB/hub, should include significant logistics capabilities including a port, or excellent over-land connection to a port, to enable sustainment. The spokes/COBs should be bare-bones facilities which can be sustained via air or more limited surface transportation. Additionally, hubs and spokes should be mutually supporting both in terms of defensive capabilities and in their ability to handle aircraft. In terms of ability to handle aircraft, for bases to support fighters they need 8,000 feet of useable runway, while bombers and key elements U.S. ISR capabilities require 10,000 feet of runway. Finally, this model can help balance tradeoffs in other areas like security. For example, a hub could be in a more populated area to ease logistics and personnel requirements, while the bulk of the combat power might be dispersed to more remote spokes.Given the increasing range of conventional fires, it’s unlikely that U.S. bases in the Pacific will be able to exist outside the effective range of PRC fires. That being said, hubs and spokes would complicate China’s ability to target U.S. bases. It would force the PLA to monitor more locations and to divide their forces between multiple locations. Placing the bases outside the range of the majority of PRC fires assets would further force them to divide their limited number of long-range ISR and fires assets. The most recent Department of Defense estimate provided to Congress states that the PRC has 570 ground-based launchers for short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, ICBM). However, only 80 of those, the DF-26 IRBM, would be used to target Guam, the other Marianas Islands or Palau. The remainder of the PRC’s missiles either can’t reach those targets (i.e. SRBMs and MRBMs), or are nuclear forces (i.e. ICBMs) and would be reserved for nuclear attacks (which brings up scenarios that are outside the scope of this piece). The Philippines have locations, including Clark and Subic Bay in Northern Luzon, that are within the range of some of China’s SRBMs and other areas that China could only reach with IRBMs. The Philippines appear to offer the ideal location for U.S. bases, but it is currently politically unfeasible given President Rodrigo Duterte’s eagerness to partner with China instead of the United States. That being said, the U.S. should eye the Philippines for basing options after 2022, when the Philippines should inaugurate a new president. The Philippines has a number of excellent ports including Subic Bay, which has been a hub for U.S. operations in the past. In addition to Subic, Clark Air Base has supported U.S. air operations in the past. Beyond Clark, the Philippines has a network of established airbases that the U.S. could potentially use to enhance resiliency and complicate Chinese targeting. However, there are some important issues associated with potential basing in the Philippines. First, the island of Luzon’s proximity to key areas – the SCS and Taiwan – is both a blessing and a curse. Luzon’s geographic location is a blessing because it means that it would be easier for aircraft to get to the potential fight, but also a curse because airbases there would be vulnerable to a greater number of Chinese ballistic missiles. Similarly, there may be a measure of security for U.S. forces operating from Luzon; the PRC may be hesitant to widen a conflict in the SCS or with Taiwan by drawing in the Philippines. However, such diplomacy is a double-edged sword; the Philippines, in an effort to avoid being drawn into a conflict with China, may prohibit the U.S. from launching combat or support missions from airbases in the Philippines similar to what Turkey did during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.Moving east from the Philippines is Palau, which has three options for U.S. bases: Koror, Peleliu, and Angaur. Koror has a port and a functioning airfield. Its airfield has a 7,200-foot runway, which makes it suitable for transport aircraft but limits its utility for fighters. Additionally, extending Koror’s airfield would require construction on the one runway servicing the islands, which would interrupt commercial traffic. Koror’s airfield has security challenges as well. It is a civil airfield and the island is a scuba diving hotspot — so it has a slew of resorts. Koror would, however, be potentially suitable as a hub for operations originating in Palau.South of Koror are Peleliu and Angaur Islands. Peleliu has a 6,000-foot long, 40-foot wide runway that is overgrown and currently unusable. Angaur’s runway, at 7,000-feet by 150-feet, is closer in size to what would be required for combat operations. Adding 1,000 to 2,000-feet to support fighter operations, or up to 4,000-feet to support bomber and ISR operations to these runways is possible, even if it requires operations to extend them into what is now the sea. Developing Peleliu and Angaur should be politically feasible given recent statements by Palau’s president requesting modernization of these airfields. Additionally, there should be some ability to engage in burden sharing with Palau, including options to use Palau’s police force as security for U.S. forces. Peleliu and Angaur are far less visited than Koror, making them easier to secure and thus more suitable for military operations. Both islands have limited facilities, but the United States could use Koror for personnel and administrative functions while establishing bare-bones facilities at Peleliu or Angaur. U.S. forces in Palau would lack mutual support with those operating in Guam or the Marianas, but they would also force even greater complexity on Chinese targeting. That being said, if the United States were to establish multiple bases in Palau, those bases would enjoy mutual support with one another. The U.S. should also develop airfields on its own territory in the Marianas including those on Guam, Saipan and Tinian. Guam has an excellent port, a naval base and a major Air Force Base. Andersen AFB would be an excellent hub, but right now it is without spokes. Potential spokes include airfields on Guam or in the Northern Marianas Islands. Orote Field, located on the Navy Base Guam, has a 4,000-foot defunct runway, which could be lengthened and improved. Additionally, being on a navy base gives Orote a measure of security and logistical supportability. However, Orote is limited in its ability to complicate the PRC’s targeting, since Guam is already a likely point of interest for the PRC. The Northern Marianas Islands (NMI) have two international airports. Tinian and Saipan both have functioning runways exceeding 8,000-feet and are between 120 and 140-miles respectively from Andersen AFB. Both islands also have defunct airfields that could be returned to service to provide a more secure location for military operations, though at higher cost than converting the international airports to dual use facilities. Tinian and Saipan could serve as spokes for the Guamanian hub, and forces in NMI would share a measure of mutual support with forces on Guam. Aircraft based at Guam could reasonably use NMI fields as divert fields. Additionally, Patriot Missile sites on Tinian or Saipan would likely overlap in coverage with those on Guam, forcing China to target multiple mutually supporting bases.Of course, just because the United States can develop bases in the Philippines, Palau, or Marianas, doesn’t mean it should. Furthermore, additional bases should not just complicate Chinese targeting but they should also improve the United States’ geostrategic position and provide the U.S. with strategic options. Developing additional bases in Palau, the Marianas and eventually the Philippines will help the U.S. ensure the survivability of combat power in the Philippine Sea, enable force projection from the Philippine Sea, and provide multiple lines of operation converging on strategic terrain. Fighter aircraft operating from Palau or the Marianas will be operating at extreme ranges to directly support U.S. operations in support of Taiwan, the SCS or ECS. However, aircraft from Palau or the Marianas could support Navy assets operating in and from the Philippine Sea. For example, USAF fighters could provide fleet defense for a carrier-based force operating in the Philippine Sea, which would free up carrier-based fighters for offensive missions. In some respects this is similar to the concept developed in World War II of having multiple carriers operating together with one as the duty carrier and the other as a strike carrier. Of course, aircraft with longer ranges would be able to carry out independent missions as well. Bases in Palau and the Marianas would allow the United States to ensure secure lines of communication from the Philippine Sea to key American interests in Taiwan and Okinawa. Additionally, in the event that the Philippines strengthen ties with the PRC, bases in Palau can serve to defend America’s western flank including the lines of communication between the Marianas and Okinawa and Taiwan. If the Philippines returns to the American camp, bases in Palau can help ensure lines of communication to the Philippines. With secure lines of communication, the U.S. could establish base networks in the Philippines to project power into the SCS and toward Taiwan and can look to establish additional basing options around the SCS. US and Philippines said to be in talks on rocket system to deter Beijing’s ‘militarisation’ in South China SeaSecurity experts say the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the American system could be too expensive for Manila Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the disputed Spratly chain would be in striking distance if it’s deployed, according to one analysis An influential defence think tank has urged the US to deploy the high-mobility artillery rocket system in Southeast Asian countries. Washington and Manila have been discussing the potential deployment of an upgraded US rocket system in a bid to deter Beijing’s “militarisation” of its artificial islands in the contested South China Sea, according to regional security experts. But the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) could be too expensive for Manila given its tight defence budget, they said. The allies’ defence chiefs, however, reaffirmed their “enduring alliance” on Monday in Washington, and agreed to increase the interoperability of their forces and US support for the modernisation of the Philippines’ armed forces. The latest reaffirmation echoed US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s mutual defence reassurance in Manila last month, when Pompeo singled out the threat of “China’s island-building and military activities” in the disputed waterway. If deployed, the long-range, precision-guided rockets fired by the system would be able to strike Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the Spratly chain, one expert said. The revelation came after an influential defence think tank, the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, warned in a new report that the US’ “freedom of navigation” operations had failed to fundamentally alter Beijing’s course in the South China Sea. Beijing has reportedly installed anti-ship and surface-to-air missile systems on three artificial islands on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs in the Spratly chain, posing a potential hurdle to US military access in the contested area. It rejected a US demand that the missiles be removed during high-level diplomatic and security talks in Washington in November. ‘Time for tougher deterrence from China’ as US steps up patrols in South China Sea 29 Mar 2019 The think tank’s report released on March 21 urged the US to deploy HIMARS in Southeast Asian countries, which will “demonstrate the flexibility and variability of America’s rotational military presence”.

The story of Palau and its place in US military strategy

An archipelago of just 21,000 inhabitants, Palau has come to have a special place in the strategic plans of the world’s largest economy. We find out why the US places such importance on continued cooperation.

“Palau is indispensable to our national security,” claimed the US Department of Defense in its 2018 budget request, describing the need for America to meet its funding commitments to this small Pacific state as ‘key to our strategic presence in the region’.

That would be a huge accolade for any nation, but for one with a total landmass amounting to just 180 square miles, spread over a chain of some 340 islands, roughly 500 miles south east of the Philippines; it is nothing short of remarkable.

The United States’ involvement with these islands dates back to the ‘Operation Forager’ campaign of June to November 1944, which ultimately saw US forces take Palau from the Japanese after a bloody and protracted two-and-a-half months of fighting at the Battle of Peleliu. After the Second World War, Palau, which had been placed under Japanese control by the League of Nations at the end of WWI, was then put under US administration by the United Nations as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).

The original 1947 trusteeship agreement designated the TTPI a “strategic area” and until 1951, it was controlled by the US Navy from Guam, after which time the US Department of the Interior took over from a base in Saipan.

Compact renewal

Subsequently, moves towards Palauan independence began in 1978, with Palau finally becoming a sovereign state in 1994. Before that happened, however, the country joined with its TTPI fellows, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), signing a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the USA in 1982.

Under the terms of the COFA, the US provides a package of financial assistance which is administered via the Office of Insular Affairs, and assumes responsibility for national defence and security, in return for the exclusive freedom to operate and base American armed forces across the COFA territory.

The arrangement was intended to hold sway for 50 years, with a series of phased reviews and renewals along the way. However, while the compacts with the FSM and RMI were renewed for 20 years in 2003, and despite the successful conclusion of the Compact Renewal Agreement (CRA) talks for Palau in late 2010, there has been much foot-dragging around implementing it.As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred .”

As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred from the Pentagon to the Interior Department, apparently citing reasons of ‘Congressional oversight’.

For an island chain that few could find readily on a map, and for a sum of $123.9m over seven years – scarcely a drop in the ocean of US military spending – the argument in favour of renewal has drawn some pretty heavy-weight supporters, including the Head of the US Pacific Command, Senator John McCain and even the President himself. The reasons are clear; as the Whitehouse warned in its Statement of Administration Policy on the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), failing to approve the CRA risks the US losing “access and influence in a region that is increasingly contested by China.”

Strategic posture

Nearly 75 years on from the Pacific campaigns of WWII, Palau remains as strategically important as ever, commanding the approaches to Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, and flanking a number of other islands and archipelagos. Having exclusive military access to such a critically located swathe of real estate provides the US with what Admiral Harry Harris, Head of Pacific Command, has described as ‘a measurable advantage in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific’.

Perhaps more to the point, it is one which Beijing would, unquestionably, be only too ready to gain for itself, should the opportunity arise. Given China’s ongoing policy of expanding its sphere of influence in an attempt to become the preeminent power in the region, a move towards Palau would be a very real possibility if the COFA renewal fails to materialise.

For more than a decade, Beijing has been quietly encouraging the small Pacific nations, and most notably Fiji, to adopt a ‘look north’ approach and increasingly engage with Asia through China, backed up with the lure of enhanced Chinese economic and military co-operation. If the US really were to leave Palau with a funding vacuum, then it is hard to imagine that a suitably attractive offer denominated in yuan would not be forthcoming if it meant that Beijing could finally prise the island chain away from American control.

Future of the CRA

Exactly how large a hole that might leave in US military preparedness in the Asia-Pacific is hard to gauge, as very little detail is forthcoming about the precise nature of the role that Palau plays in it, beyond its very obvious strategic geography. There are very few clues to be gleaned from the terms of the COFA itself, beyond the prohibition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the islands and the eligibility of Palauan citizens to serve in the US armed forces.

Apart from the occasionally publicised war games, such as the Embassy evacuation exercise in August 2015, the rest of whatever it is that the US does here appears to be too sensitive to make public. It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA.

“It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA.”

That future is likely to be decided in the months ahead, as the 2018 NDAA moves through the House-Senate conference committee stage and Congress members look to resolve the differences of position between the two chambers. Senator John McCain’s Senate Armed Service Committee has already included approval of the CRA in its version of the Act, paving the way for the Conference committee to merge the upper and lower chambers’ proposals, and finally allow the Palau Compact to be renewed and funded.

The Senate Armed Service Committee’s argument is widely expected to prevail during the forthcoming conference discussions. While there is some understanding of the House of Representatives’ reticence over transferring budget funds from one department to another, few Washington commentators believe that this will trump the potential loss of prime operational geography, or the diminution of prestige and influence it would inevitably entail.

As military spending goes, $17.7m a year will not buy very much – perhaps a new MQ-9 Reaper drone and some change to run it, or a 10% share in an F-35. Conversely of course, it could be used to buy another year’s exclusive access to some of the most strategically important islands in the Pacific. It is very hard to see the US walking away from that sort of bargain.

The U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. 

A 69th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron B-52 Stratofortress prepares to taxi down the flightline on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Oct. 22, 2019.

the Pacific, but provided few details regarding exact locations or operating concepts. Given the security situation in the Pacific, the U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. Furthermore, operating concepts for the hub and spoke base networks should aim to enhance resiliency, frustrate Chinese targeting, and further the United States’ geostrategic position.

Esper’s call for additional basing is necessary based on U.S. interests, lack of current basing options, and China’s assertiveness. The recent Chinese Defense White Paper highlights China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, which is matched by actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and around Taiwan. These actions threaten American interests in the region, including freedom of navigation and the military geography of the U.S. position in the Pacific. Ultimately, U.S and allied military power in the region is the guarantor of the fair trade upon which the United States depends. Unfortunately, the United States has limited air bases in the region from which to project power. On the Asian mainland, the United States has only two air bases in South Korea, both of which are focused on preparing for and deterring war with North Korea. Beyond the mainland, the United States maintains air bases in Japan, but only Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is positioned to secure U.S. interests in the East China Sea (ECS) or SCS. The United States also maintains a base on Guam; however, the concentration of forces there make it a prime target for enemy operations. To help safeguard U.S. interests and to check China, the United States needs to establish a more robust base network in the region.

The United States should develop an integrated base network using a hub and spoke model. A hub and spoke base network includes a main operating base (MOB) and collocated operating bases (COBs). This is not a new idea; the U.S. Air Force used a similar model to ensure survivability during the Cold War. The Cold War model was designed for continental use but could be adapted to the Pacific. In the original model, the MOB, or hub, was where the Air Force had forces permanently stationed. The spokes — COBs — were bare bones facilities. During peacetime the majority of forces would be based at the hubs; however, indications of war would trigger dispersal to the spokes. A 1986 RAND report identifies the required and desired facilities for COBs, summarized in Table 1.




Additionally, the MOB/hub, should include significant logistics capabilities including a port, or excellent over-land connection to a port, to enable sustainment. The spokes/COBs should be bare-bones facilities which can be sustained via air or more limited surface transportation. Additionally, hubs and spokes should be mutually supporting both in terms of defensive capabilities and in their ability to handle aircraft. In terms of ability to handle aircraft, for bases to support fighters they need 8,000 feet of useable runway, while bombers and key elements U.S. ISR capabilities require 10,000 feet of runway. Finally, this model can help balance tradeoffs in other areas like security. For example, a hub could be in a more populated area to ease logistics and personnel requirements, while the bulk of the combat power might be dispersed to more remote spokes.




Given the increasing range of conventional fires, it’s unlikely that U.S. bases in the Pacific will be able to exist outside the effective range of PRC fires. That being said, hubs and spokes would complicate China’s ability to target U.S. bases. It would force the PLA to monitor more locations and to divide their forces between multiple locations. Placing the bases outside the range of the majority of PRC fires assets would further force them to divide their limited number of long-range ISR and fires assets. The most recent Department of Defense estimate provided to Congress states that the PRC has 570 ground-based launchers for short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, ICBM). However, only 80 of those, the DF-26 IRBM, would be used to target Guam, the other Marianas Islands or Palau. The remainder of the PRC’s missiles either can’t reach those targets (i.e. SRBMs and MRBMs), or are nuclear forces (i.e. ICBMs) and would be reserved for nuclear attacks (which brings up scenarios that are outside the scope of this piece). The Philippines have locations, including Clark and Subic Bay in Northern Luzon, that are within the range of some of China’s SRBMs and other areas that China could only reach with IRBMs.

The Philippines appear to offer the ideal location for U.S. bases, but it is currently politically unfeasible given President Rodrigo Duterte’s eagerness to partner with China instead of the United States. That being said, the U.S. should eye the Philippines for basing options after 2022, when the Philippines should inaugurate a new president. The Philippines has a number of excellent ports including Subic Bay, which has been a hub for U.S. operations in the past. In addition to Subic, Clark Air Base has supported U.S. air operations in the past. Beyond Clark, the Philippines has a network of established airbases that the U.S. could potentially use to enhance resiliency and complicate Chinese targeting.

However, there are some important issues associated with potential basing in the Philippines. First, the island of Luzon’s proximity to key areas – the SCS and Taiwan – is both a blessing and a curse. Luzon’s geographic location is a blessing because it means that it would be easier for aircraft to get to the potential fight, but also a curse because airbases there would be vulnerable to a greater number of Chinese ballistic missiles. Similarly, there may be a measure of security for U.S. forces operating from Luzon; the PRC may be hesitant to widen a conflict in the SCS or with Taiwan by drawing in the Philippines. However, such diplomacy is a double-edged sword; the Philippines, in an effort to avoid being drawn into a conflict with China, may prohibit the U.S. from launching combat or support missions from airbases in the Philippines similar to what Turkey did during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.Moving east from the Philippines is Palau, which has three options for U.S. bases: Koror, Peleliu, and Angaur. Koror has a port and a functioning airfield. Its airfield has a 7,200-foot runway, which makes it suitable for transport aircraft but limits its utility for fighters. Additionally, extending Koror’s airfield would require construction on the one runway servicing the islands, which would interrupt commercial traffic. Koror’s airfield has security challenges as well. It is a civil airfield and the island is a scuba diving hotspot — so it has a slew of resorts. Koror would, however, be potentially suitable as a hub for operations originating in Palau.

South of Koror are Peleliu and Angaur Islands. Peleliu has a 6,000-foot long, 40-foot wide runway that is overgrown and currently unusable. Angaur’s runway, at 7,000-feet by 150-feet, is closer in size to what would be required for combat operations. Adding 1,000 to 2,000-feet to support fighter operations, or up to 4,000-feet to support bomber and ISR operations to these runways is possible, even if it requires operations to extend them into what is now the sea. Developing Peleliu and Angaur should be politically feasible given recent statements by Palau’s president requesting modernization of these airfields. Additionally, there should be some ability to engage in burden sharing with Palau, including options to use Palau’s police force as security for U.S. forces. Peleliu and Angaur are far less visited than Koror, making them easier to secure and thus more suitable for military operations. Both islands have limited facilities, but the United States could use Koror for personnel and administrative functions while establishing bare-bones facilities at Peleliu or Angaur. U.S. forces in Palau would lack mutual support with those operating in Guam or the Marianas, but they would also force even greater complexity on Chinese targeting. That being said, if the United States were to establish multiple bases in Palau, those bases would enjoy mutual support with one another.

The U.S. should also develop airfields on its own territory in the Marianas including those on Guam, Saipan and Tinian. Guam has an excellent port, a naval base and a major Air Force Base. Andersen AFB would be an excellent hub, but right now it is without spokes. Potential spokes include airfields on Guam or in the Northern Marianas Islands.

Orote Field, located on the Navy Base Guam, has a 4,000-foot defunct runway, which could be lengthened and improved. Additionally, being on a navy base gives Orote a measure of security and logistical supportability. However, Orote is limited in its ability to complicate the PRC’s targeting, since Guam is already a likely point of interest for the PRC.

The Northern Marianas Islands (NMI) have two international airports. Tinian and Saipan both have functioning runways exceeding 8,000-feet and are between 120 and 140-miles respectively from Andersen AFB. Both islands also have defunct airfields that could be returned to service to provide a more secure location for military operations, though at higher cost than converting the international airports to dual use facilities. Tinian and Saipan could serve as spokes for the Guamanian hub, and forces in NMI would share a measure of mutual support with forces on Guam. Aircraft based at Guam could reasonably use NMI fields as divert fields. Additionally, Patriot Missile sites on Tinian or Saipan would likely overlap in coverage with those on Guam, forcing China to target multiple mutually supporting bases.

Of course, just because the United States can develop bases in the Philippines, Palau, or Marianas, doesn’t mean it should. Furthermore, additional bases should not just complicate Chinese targeting but they should also improve the United States’ geostrategic position and provide the U.S. with strategic options. Developing additional bases in Palau, the Marianas and eventually the Philippines will help the U.S. ensure the survivability of combat power in the Philippine Sea, enable force projection from the Philippine Sea, and provide multiple lines of operation converging on strategic terrain. Fighter aircraft operating from Palau or the Marianas will be operating at extreme ranges to directly support U.S. operations in support of Taiwan, the SCS or ECS. However, aircraft from Palau or the Marianas could support Navy assets operating in and from the Philippine Sea. For example, USAF fighters could provide fleet defense for a carrier-based force operating in the Philippine Sea, which would free up carrier-based fighters for offensive missions. In some respects this is similar to the concept developed in World War II of having multiple carriers operating together with one as the duty carrier and the other as a strike carrier. Of course, aircraft with longer ranges would be able to carry out independent missions as well.

Bases in Palau and the Marianas would allow the United States to ensure secure lines of communication from the Philippine Sea to key American interests in Taiwan and Okinawa. Additionally, in the event that the Philippines strengthen ties with the PRC, bases in Palau can serve to defend America’s western flank including the lines of communication between the Marianas and Okinawa and Taiwan. If the Philippines returns to the American camp, bases in Palau can help ensure lines of communication to the Philippines. With secure lines of communication, the U.S. could establish base networks in the Philippines to project power into the SCS and toward Taiwan and can look to establish additional basing options around the SCS.

US and Philippines said to be in talks on rocket system to deter Beijing’s ‘militarisation’ in South China SeaSecurity experts say the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the American system could be too expensive for Manila

Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the disputed Spratly chain would be in striking distance if it’s deployed, according to one analysis

An influential defence think tank has urged the US to deploy the high-mobility artillery rocket system in Southeast Asian countries. 

Washington and Manila have been discussing the potential deployment of an upgraded US rocket system in a bid to deter Beijing’s “militarisation” of its artificial islands in the contested South China Sea, according to regional security experts.

But the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) could be too expensive for Manila given its tight defence budget, they said.

The allies’ defence chiefs, however, reaffirmed their “enduring alliance” on Monday in Washington, and agreed to increase the interoperability of their forces and US support for the modernisation of the Philippines’ armed forces.

The latest reaffirmation echoed US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s mutual defence reassurance in Manila last month, when Pompeo singled out the threat of “China’s island-building and military activities” in the disputed waterway.

If deployed, the long-range, precision-guided rockets fired by the system would be able to strike Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the Spratly chain, one expert said.

The revelation came after an influential defence think tank, the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, warned in a new report that the US’ “freedom of navigation” operations had failed to fundamentally alter Beijing’s course in the South China Sea.

Beijing has reportedly installed anti-ship and surface-to-air missile systems on three artificial islands on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs in the Spratly chain, posing a potential hurdle to US military access in the contested area. It rejected a US demand that the missiles be removed during high-level diplomatic and security talks in Washington in November.

‘Time for tougher deterrence from China’ as US steps up patrols in South China Sea

29 Mar 2019

The think tank’s report released on March 21 urged the US to deploy HIMARS in Southeast Asian countries, which will “demonstrate the flexibility and variability of America’s rotational military presence”.

INTENTIONAL DISGUISED BIO WARFARE

The Comprehensive Timeline of China’s COVID-19 Lies

China lied to the world that CCP virus is not highly contagious like SARS so countries will not close their borders to Chinese visitors thereby spreading and making it a global pandemic.

China is the chief producer of PPE in the world, and to control the supply, CCP hoarded $2B worth of PPE from the US, Australia, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, etc. in December of 2019, knowing about the contagion and the need for the now scarce PPE. These resulted in thousands of deaths of unprotected medical personnel, and civilians, which is clearly an example of premeditated murder. Leading US manufacturers of medical safety gear told the White House that China prohibited them from exporting their products from the country as the coronavirus pandemic mounted — even as Beijing was trying to “corner the world market” in personal protective equipment. 

“In criminal law, compare this to the levels that we have for murder,” said Jenna Ellis, a senior legal adviser to Trump’s re-election campaign.

“People are dying. When you have intentional, cold-blooded, premeditated action like you have with China, this would be considered first-degree murder.”

Paramilitary officers wearing face masks to contain the spread of COVID-19 coronavirus walk along a street in Beijing, China, March 18, 2020. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)

INTENTIONAL DISGUISED BIO WARFARE

With China knowing it can not compete with the USA militarily it resorted to infect the whole world attacking 123 countries and torpedo their economies.  This is a day-by-day, month-by-month breakdown of China’s coronavirus coverup and the irreparable damage it has caused around the globe.

The Timeline of a Viral Ticking Time Bomb

The story of the coronavirus pandemic is still being written. But at this early date, we can see all kinds of moments where different decisions could have lessened the severity of the outbreak we are currently enduring. You have probably heard variations of: “Chinese authorities denied that the virus could be transferred from human to human until it was too late.” What you have probably not heard is how emphatically, loudly, and repeatedly the Chinese government insisted human transmission was impossible, long after doctors in Wuhan had concluded human transmission was ongoing — and how the World Health Organization assented to that conclusion, despite the suspicions of other outside health experts.

Clearly, the U.S. government’s response to this threat was not nearly robust enough, and not enacted anywhere near quickly enough. Most European governments weren’t prepared either. Few governments around the world were or are prepared for the scale of the danger. We can only wonder whether accurate and timely information from China would have altered the way the U.S. government, the American people, and the world prepared for the oncoming danger of infection.

Some point in late 2019: The coronavirus jumps from some animal species to a human being. The best guess at this point is that it happened at a Chinese “wet market.”

December 6: According to a study in The Lancet, the symptom onset date of the first patient identified was “Dec 1, 2019 . . . 5 days after illness onset, his wife, a 53-year-old woman who had no known history of exposure to the market, also presented with pneumonia and was hospitalized in the isolation ward.” In other words, as early as the second week of December, Wuhan doctors were finding cases that indicated the virus was spreading from one human to another.

December 21: Wuhan doctors begin to notice a “cluster of pneumonia cases with an unknown cause.”

December 25: Chinese medical staff in two hospitals in Wuhan are suspected of contracting viral pneumonia and are quarantined. This is additional strong evidence of human-to-human transmission.

Sometime in “Late December”: Wuhan hospitals notice “an exponential increase” in the number of cases that cannot be linked back to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, according to the New England Journal of Medicine.

December 30: Dr. Li Wenliang sent a message to a group of other doctors warning them about a possible outbreak of an illness that resembled severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), urging them to take protective measures against infection.

December 31: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission declares, “The investigation so far has not found any obvious human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infection.” This is the opposite of the belief of the doctors working on patients in Wuhan, and two doctors were already suspected of contracting the virus.

Three weeks after doctors first started noticing the cases, China contacts the World Health Organization.

Tao Lina, a public-health expert and former official with Shanghai’s center for disease control and prevention, tells the South China Morning Post, “I think we are [now] quite capable of killing it in the beginning phase, given China’s disease control system, emergency handling capacity and clinical medicine support.”

January 1: The Wuhan Public Security Bureau issued summons to Dr. Li Wenliang, accusing him of “spreading rumors.” Two days later, at a police station, Dr. Li signed a statement acknowledging his “misdemeanor” and promising not to commit further “unlawful acts.” Seven other people are arrested on similar charges and their fate is unknown.

Also that day, “after several batches of genome sequence results had been returned to hospitals and submitted to health authorities, an employee of one genomics company received a phone call from an official at the Hubei Provincial Health Commission, ordering the company to stop testing samples from Wuhan related to the new disease and destroy all existing samples.”

According to a New York Times study of cellphone data from China, 175,000 people leave Wuhan that day. According to global travel data research firm OAG, 21 countries have direct flights to Wuhan. In the first quarter of 2019 for comparison, 13,267 air passengers traveled from Wuhan, China, to destinations in the United States, or about 4,422 per month. The U.S. government would not bar foreign nationals who had traveled to China from entering the country for another month.

January 2: One study of patients in Wuhan can only connect 27 of 41 infected patients to exposure to the Huanan seafood market — indicating human-to-human transmission away from the market. A report written later that month concludes, “evidence so far indicates human transmission for 2019-nCoV. We are concerned that 2019-nCoV could have acquired the ability for efficient human transmission.”

Also on this day, the Wuhan Institute of Virology completed mapped the genome of the virus. The Chinese government would not announce that breakthrough for another week.

January 3: The Chinese government continued efforts to suppress all information about the virus: “China’s National Health Commission, the nation’s top health authority, ordered institutions not to publish any information related to the unknown disease, and ordered labs to transfer any samples they had to designated testing institutions, or to destroy them.”

Roughly one month after the first cases in Wuhan, the United States government is notified. Robert Redfield, the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, gets initial reports about a new coronavirus from Chinese colleagues, according to Health and Human Services secretary Alex Azar. Azar, who helped manage the response at HHS to earlier SARS and anthrax outbreaks, told his chief of staff to make sure the National Security Council was informed.

Also on this day, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission released another statement, repeating, “As of now, preliminary investigations have shown no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infections.”

January 4: While Chinese authorities continued to insist that the virus could not spread from one person to another, doctors outside that country weren’t so convinced. The head of the University of Hong Kong’s Centre for Infection, Ho Pak-leung, warned that “the city should implement the strictest possible monitoring system for a mystery new viral pneumonia that has infected dozens of people on the mainland, as it is highly possible that the illness is spreading from human to human.”

January 5: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission put out a statement with updated numbers of cases but repeated, “preliminary investigations have shown no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infections.”

January 6: The New York Times publishes its first report about the virus, declaring that “59 people in the central city of Wuhan have been sickened by a pneumonia-like illness.” That first report included these comments:

Wang Linfa, an expert on emerging infectious diseases at the Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore, said he was frustrated that scientists in China were not allowed to speak to him about the outbreak. Dr. Wang said, however, that he thought the virus was likely not spreading from humans to humans because health workers had not contracted the disease. “We should not go into panic mode,” he said.

Don’t get too mad at Wang Linfa; he was making that assessment based upon the inaccurate information Chinese government was telling the world.

Also that day, the CDC “issued a level 1 travel watch — the lowest of its three levels — for China’s outbreak. It said the cause and the transmission mode aren’t yet known, and it advised travelers to Wuhan to avoid living or dead animals, animal markets, and contact with sick people.”

Also that day, the CDC offered to send a team to China to assist with the investigation. The Chinese government declined, but a WHO team that included two Americans would visit February 16.

January 8: Chinese medical authorities claim to have identified the virus. Those authorities claim and Western media continue to repeat, “there is no evidence that the new virus is readily spread by humans, which would make it particularly dangerous, and it has not been tied to any deaths.”

The official statement from the World Health Organization declares, “Preliminary identification of a novel virus in a short period of time is a notable achievement and demonstrates China’s increased capacity to manage new outbreaks . . . WHO does not recommend any specific measures for travelers. WHO advises against the application of any travel or trade restrictions on China based on the information currently available.”

January 10: After unknowingly treating a patient with the Wuhan coronavirus, Dr. Li Wenliang started coughing and developed a fever. He was hospitalized on January 12. In the following days, Li’s condition deteriorated so badly that he was admitted to the intensive care unit and given oxygen support.

The New York Times quotes the Wuhan City Health Commission’s declaration that “there is no evidence the virus can spread among humans.” Chinese doctors continued to find transmission among family members, contradicting the official statements from the city health commission.

January 11: The Wuhan City Health Commission issues an update declaring, “All 739 close contacts, including 419 medical staff, have undergone medical observation and no related cases have been found . . . No new cases have been detected since January 3, 2020. At present, no medical staff infections have been found, and no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission has been found.” They issue a Q&A sheet later that day reemphasizing that “most of the unexplained viral pneumonia cases in Wuhan this time have a history of exposure to the South China seafood market. No clear evidence of human-to-human transmission has been found.”

Also on this day, political leaders in Hubei province, which includes Wuhan, began their regional meeting. The coronavirus was not mentioned over four days of meetings.

January 13: Authorities in Thailand detected the virus in a 61-year-old Chinese woman who was visiting from Wuhan, the first case outside of China. “Thailand’s Ministry of Public Health, said the woman had not visited the Wuhan seafood market, and had come down with a fever on Jan. 5. However, the doctor said, the woman had visited a different, smaller market in Wuhan, in which live and freshly slaughtered animals were also sold.”

January 14: Wuhan city health authorities release another statement declaring, “Among the close contacts, no related cases were found.” Wuhan doctors have known this was false since early December, from the first victim and his wife, who did not visit the market.

The World Health Organization echoes China’s assessment: “Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) identified in Wuhan, China.”

This is five or six weeks after the first evidence of human-to-human transmission in Wuhan.

January 15: Japan reported its first case of coronavirus. Japan’s Health Ministry said the patient had not visited any seafood markets in China, adding that “it is possible that the patient had close contact with an unknown patient with lung inflammation while in China.”

The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission begins to change its statements, now declaring, “Existing survey results show that clear human-to-human evidence has not been found, and the possibility of limited human-to-human transmission cannot be ruled out, but the risk of continued human-to-human transmission is low.” Recall Wuhan hospitals concluded human-to-human transmission was occurring three weeks earlier. A statement the next day backtracks on the possibility of human transmission, saying only, “Among the close contacts, no related cases were found.”

January 17: The CDC and the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection announce that travelers from Wuhan to the United States will undergo entry screening for symptoms associated with 2019-nCoV at three U.S. airports that receive most of the travelers from Wuhan, China: San Francisco, New York (JFK), and Los Angeles airports.

The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission’s daily update declares, “A total of 763 close contacts have been tracked, 665 medical observations have been lifted, and 98 people are still receiving medical observations. Among the close contacts, no related cases were found.”

January 18: HHS Secretary Azar has his first discussion about the virus with President Trump. Unnamed “senior administration officials” told the Washington Post that “the president interjected to ask about vaping and when flavored vaping products would be back on the market.”

Despite the fact that Wuhan doctors know the virus is contagious, city authorities allow 40,000 families to gather and share home-cooked food in a Lunar New Year banquet.

January 19: The Chinese National Health Commission declares the virus “still preventable and controllable.” The World Health Organization updates its statement, declaring, “Not enough is known to draw definitive conclusions about how it is transmitted, the clinical features of the disease, the extent to which it has spread, or its source, which remains unknown.”

January 20: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission declares for the last time in its daily bulletin, “no related cases were found among the close contacts.”

That day, the head of China’s national health commission team investigating the outbreak, confirmed that two cases of infection in China’s Guangdong province had been caused by human-to-human transmission and medical staff had been infected.

Also on this date, the Wuhan Evening News newspaper, the largest newspaper in the city, mentions the virus on the front page for the first time since January 5.

January 21: The CDC announced the first U.S. case of a the coronavirus in a Snohomish County, Wash., resident who returning from China six days earlier.

By this point, millions of people have left Wuhan, carrying the virus all around China and into other countries.

January 22: WHO director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus continued to praise China’s handling of the outbreak. “I was very impressed by the detail and depth of China’s presentation. I also appreciate the cooperation of China’s Minister of Health, who I have spoken with directly during the last few days and weeks. His leadership and the intervention of President Xi and Premier Li have been invaluable, and all the measures they have taken to respond to the outbreak.”

In the preceding days, a WHO delegation conducted a field visit to Wuhan. They concluded, “deployment of the new test kit nationally suggests that human-to-human transmission is taking place in Wuhan.” The delegation reports, “their counterparts agreed close attention should be paid to hand and respiratory hygiene, food safety and avoiding mass gatherings where possible.”

At a meeting of the WHO Emergency Committee, panel members express “divergent views on whether this event constitutes a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern’ or not. At that time, the advice was that the event did not constitute a PHEIC.”

President Trump, in an interview with CNBC at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, declared, “We have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China. We have it under control. It’s going to be just fine.”

January 23: Chinese authorities announce their first steps for a quarantine of Wuhan. By this point, millions have already visited the city and left it during the Lunar New Year celebrations. Singapore and Vietnam report their first cases, and by now an unknown but significant number of Chinese citizens have traveled abroad as asymptomatic, oblivious carriers.

January 24: Vietnam reports person-to-person transmission, and Japan, South Korea, and the U.S report their second cases. The second case is in Chicago. Within two days, new cases are reported in Los Angeles, Orange County, and Arizona. The virus is in now in several locations in the United States, and the odds of preventing an outbreak are dwindling to zero.

On February 1, Dr. Li Wenliang tested positive for coronavirus. He died from it six days later.

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One final note: On February 4, Mayor of Florence Dario Nardella urged residents to hug Chinese people to encourage them in the fight against the novel coronavirus. Meanwhile, a member of Associazione Unione Giovani Italo Cinesi, a Chinese society in Italy aimed at promoting friendship between people in the two countries, called for respect for novel coronavirus patients during a street demonstration. “I’m not a virus. I’m a human. Eradicate the prejudice.”

This kind of behaviour should not go on unpunished, China should bare the consequence by isolating it, and subjecting the CCP leaders like the Nuremberg trials in WWII.